Circumstances Not Catered For In IFG Typology

Matthiessen (1995: 344):

Certain examples of circumstances are not really catered for in the IFG typology presented above. They include For us, this is a boon; it was a sad day for most of us (but cf. Angle above).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, on the IFG model, these are participants — Beneficiaries — not circumstances.

The Direction Of Coding In SFL Theorising

Matthiessen (1995: 306):

Intensive clauses play an important role in linguistic theory because they allow us to construe various relationships that are fundamental in semiotic systems. For instance, identifying intensive clauses can construe realisation — the relationship between SIGNIFIED (Value) and SIGNIFIER (Token). See Figure 4-29 and note that the direction is from the signifier to the signified — the interpretive direction in linguistic theorising.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the direction from Token to Value is decoding (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 280) and this applies to theorising in which lower levels of abstraction, e.g. forms, are decoded by reference to higher levels of abstraction, e.g. meanings.

Theorising in SFL, however, proceeds in the opposite direction: higher levels of abstraction, e.g. meanings, are encoded by reference to lower levels of abstraction, e.g. forms. That is, in SFL Theory, the question is not 'what do these forms mean?' but 'how are these meanings expressed?'. Halliday (1985 & 1994: xiv):

Circumstantial Relational Clauses

 Matthiessen (1995: 305):

The system RELATION TYPE is simultaneous with RELATIONAL ABSTRACTION. There are three terms — intensive/possessive/circumstantial. These three types are manifestations in the environment of relational processes of the highly generalised types of expansion that permeate the lexicogrammatical system: elaborating — intensive, extending — possessive, and enhancing — circumstantial.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the exception here is a circumstantial relational clause of matter — such as This story concerns a lost dog  — where the relation is one of projection, not enhancement.

The Agency Of Identifying Clauses

Matthiessen (1995: 305):

Identifying clauses are interpreted as invariably effective here ⁵⁸

⁵⁸ This is a simplification: Identifying can also combine with middle — see Halliday (1967/8).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, identifying clauses are only effective in agency if encoding or assigned. The least marked variant, unassigned decoding, is middle in agency.

Existential Clauses As Invariably Middle With Only One Participant

Matthiessen (1995: 300):

Existential clauses are treated as a subtype of relational clauses here. They are invariably middle. They are the limiting case, since there is only one participant, the Existent, and thus the process is no true relation — no true expansion linking two participants.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this is inconsistent with Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 157), where effective existential clauses with two participants are proposed:

Existential vs Expanding Relational Clauses

Matthiessen (1995: 299):

Relational clauses are either EXISTENTIAL or EXPANDING. Existential clauses constitute the limiting case of being — a mode of being with only one participant, the Existent. In contrast, expanding clauses always involve a relation between two participants — they are true relational clauses in this respect. (A restricted exceptional subtype will be noted below where one of the two participants is fused with the Process.) They are called expanding relational clauses because the relation covers the same semantic space as expansion elsewhere in the grammar, e.g., in the clause complex and in conjunction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014) distinguish existential clauses from relational clauses.

[2] To be clear, the exception here is a circumstantial relational clause of matter — such as This story concerns a lost dog  — where the relation is one of projection, not expansion.

Processes Of Verbal Impact

Matthiessen (1995: 285):

Processes of verbal impact are also on the borderline between the verbal domain and the material domain. Like verbal processes, they have a Sayer, which can be a speaker as well as some other symbol source; but the participant addressed is not construed as a Beneficiary that may be marked by to, but rather as a Goal-like Target of verbal impact. Verbs occurring in this type of clause include:

accuse, blame, congratulate, criticise.praise, rebuke

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the 'Goal-like' Target (Medium) of such verbal clauses demonstrates that they are effective, not middle, in agency, contrary to Matthiessen (1995: 283).

Processes of Verbal Behaviour

Matthiessen (1995: 284):

Processes of verbal behaviour are on the borderline between verbal and behavioural; they can alternatively be interpreted as behavioural processes. They include:

speak, talk, argue, converse, confer, chat, chatter, gossip, yak

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014) interpret these as behavioural, not verbal.

Verbal Clauses As Middle Only

Matthiessen (1995: 283):

Table 4-30: Characteristic Properties of Verbal Clauses

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this is inconsistent with Halliday (1994: 165-6), where targeted verbal clauses are interpreted as effective:

Process + Medium Collocations In Behavioural Clauses

Matthiessen (1995: 253):

Process + Medium. There is a set of features of material process type in the context of which we find Process + Medium pairs. These general features include 

• change in quantity (fall + temperature), 
• change in quality, 
• growth & improvement (repair + [mechanical device such as] car, heal + wound, ripen + fruit, mature + child, age + wine) or
• deterioration (decay + teeth, rot + meat, wilt + flower), 
• phase: beginning (break out + war), 
• preparation for use (make + bed, lay + table, prime + gun, pump); 
• behaviour: typical sound (neigh + horse, bark + dog), 
• behaviour: typical movement (waddle + duck, trot + horse, canter + horse, flap + wing, crawl + snake), 
• behaviour: ingesting (breathe + air, inhale + smoke, drink + liquid, take + medicine).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, since the Medium of a behavioural clause is a Behaver, interpreting the collocation flap + wing construes wing as conscious. The fact that such a collocation occurs in effective material clauses is demonstrated by the agnate clause the young albatross flapped its wings where wings can only be interpreted as the Goal of a material Process.

[2] To be clear, none of these collocations occurs in behavioural clauses, because none of the so-called Mediums — air, smoke, liquid, medicine — is a Behaver (the Medium of a behavioural Process). Note that if these participants are Mediums, the clauses are effective, which contradicts Matthiessen's characterisation of behavioural clauses as middle. If, on the other hand, these participants are Ranges, these are still not behavioural clauses, because the Range of a behavioural clause is a Behaviour, and none of these — air, smoke, liquid, medicine — is a Behaviour.

Interactive (Reciprocal) Behavioural Processes [2]

Matthiessen (1995: 252-3):

Some verbs are less likely with the circumstantial option — for example Anne hugged with Henry is unlikely - and the potential coparticipant is construed alternatively as a Goal instead — hug, embrace, kiss, marry, divorce:

Anne and Henry hugged/embraced/kissed/married/divorced:

Anne hugged/embraced/kissed/married/divorced Henry

Blogger Comments:

Again, the fact that a co-participant is construed as a Goal is evidence that the Process is effective material, not middle behavioural.

Again, the interpretation of effective clauses as behavioural is inconsistent with Matthiessen (1995: 211):

If MATERIAL, MENTAL, and RELATIONAL are taken as major types, as they are in IFG, it is interesting to note that the other minor types, BEHAVIOURAL, VERBAL and EXISTENTIAL are all more restricted in AGENCY - they are middle only.

Interactive (Reciprocal) Behavioural Processes [1]

Matthiessen (1995: 252):

Interactive (reciprocal) behavioural material processes have the special property that coparticipation can be construed either as one participant which is internally complex (e.g., Henry and Anne), in which case a reciprocal pronoun as Accompaniment may be added (e.g., Henry and Anne ... with each other), or as one participant configured with a circumstance of Accompaniment (e.g., Henry ... with Anne), as in 

Henry and Anne danced/fought/chatted :

Henry and Anne danced/fought/chatted with each other:

Henry danced/fought/chatted with Anne.

In other words, a participant may be extended paratactically or circumstantially; verbs serving in this type of clause include:

dance, waltz, chat, gossip, talk, converse, negotiate, discuss, argue, sing, collaborate, meet, play, fight, box

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, fought patterns here like an effective material Process, not a middle behavioural ('material') Process, since it allows a co-participant to be construed as Goal:

Henry fought Anne

whereas a behavioural Process does not:

*Henry danced Anne

*Henry chatted Anne 

The same holds true for meet and box:

Henry met Anne

Henry boxed Anne

Moreover, the interpretation of effective clauses as behavioural is inconsistent with Matthiessen (1995: 211):

If MATERIAL, MENTAL, and RELATIONAL are taken as major types, as they are in IFG, it is interesting to note that the other minor types, BEHAVIOURAL, VERBAL and EXISTENTIAL are all more restricted in AGENCY - they are middle only. 

Behavioural Processes With Reflexive Pronouns

Matthiessen (1995: 252):

(1) Certain behavioural processes that are confined to the self may occur with or without a reflexive pronoun; these include processes of grooming — behave (oneself), clean (oneself), comb (oneself), [un]dress (oneself), hide (oneself), prepare (oneself) for, shave (oneself), stretch (oneself), wash (oneself):

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the possibility of a reflexive pronoun in such clauses rules out these verbs as serving as behavioural Processes, because, if the pronoun is interpreted as the Range of the Process, it is not a Behaviour, as it must be for behavioural clauses, and if it is interpreted as the Medium of the Process it is not a Behaver, as it must be for behavioural clauses.

Cf this impossibility for genuine behaviourals: *stare oneself, *grumble oneself, *frown oneself, *sneeze oneself, *stand oneself

Note that instances like he laughed himself sick are material clauses, as demonstrated by the inclusion of the resultative Attribute sick.

Behavioural Processes And Projection

Matthiessen (1995: 251-2):

Behavioural processes can tentatively be divided into intro-active and inter-active ones. Intro-active processes cover active equivalents of inert sensing (realised by mental clauses) — perception, cognition, and affect — and a few others. Some of these may quote. Interactive behaviour may involve extension - within the Behaver (x and y danced) or as a separate circumstance of Accompaniment (x danced with y )'., See Table 4-19.

As noted earlier, in IFG Section 5.5.1 (pp. 138-40), behavioural processes are separate from material ones; in the current grammar, they are treated as a subtype of material processes. In some earlier treatments, such as Halliday (1976: Ch. 11), those behavioural processes concerned with mental processing as an activity (smiling, laughing, listening, looking, watching, pondering, etc.) were treated as a type of mental process. The different treatments reflect the fact that behavioural processes, in some respects, fall between material processes and mental ones. For instance, like mental processes their Medium is normally conscious; but unlike mental processes (as a class) they cannot project or have a metaphenomenal Range (Phenomenon). (They can, however, have a macrophenomenal Range: Little Bobby's parents watched him recite Ode to a Grecian Urn with tears in their eyes.)

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, for Halliday, behavioural processes cannot project, and when such verbs serve in a quoting nexus, they add a behavioural feature to verbal Process. Halliday (1994: 139):

Benefactive Ranged Middle Material Clauses

Matthiessen (1995: 244):

Ranged middle material clauses that can be interpreted as a service may be benefactive in the sense of cliency and thus have a Client: He sang us an old folk song : He sang an old folk song for us.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, for Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014), these are behavioural clauses. For example, Halliday (1994: 139):

Behavioural processes are almost always middle; the most typical pattern is a clause consisting of Behaver and Process only, like Don’t breathe!, No one’s listening, He’s always grumbling. A common variant of these is that where the behaviour is dressed up as if it was a participant, like she sang a song, he gave a great yawn;