'Phenomenon-Like' Ranges In Behavioural Clauses

Matthiessen (1995: 239):

Ranges in behavioural clauses are comparable to the Phenomenon of a middle mental clause:

(Phenomenon-like in behavioural type)

He was following his father II as [Actor:] he [Process:] read [Range:] the bible.

If [Actor:] you [Process:] listen [Range:] to Herman Kahn, || Germany will be eclipsed by France in the not very distant future.

Blogger Comments:

[1]  To be clear, this is seriously inconsistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014).  For Halliday, the Range of a behavioural Process is a Behaviour (Halliday 1985: 148; Halliday 1994: 149, 166; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 251, 260, 291, 294, 295; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 301, 311, 312, 344, 346, 347). For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

A common variant of these is that where the behaviour is dressed up as if it was a participant, like she sang a song, he gave a great yawn; this structure is typical in the everyday spoken language. The participant is analogous to the Scope of a ‘material’ clause (both being manifestations of the general function of Range); we shall call it Behaviour.

[2] To be clear, the clause he read the bible satisfies all criteria for mental clauses, except unmarked present tense, which aligns it with material clauses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 354):

That is, viewed 'from above', read serves as a mental Process (with the bible as Phenomenon), but 'from below', it serves as a material Process. In SFL Theory, priority is given to the view 'from above' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 49).

Moreover, a behavioural interpretation is ruled out by the simple fact that the bible is not a behaviour, so can not be the Range of a behavioural clause. 

This case is interesting theoretically because it demonstrates that the mere overlap of mental and material features is insufficient grounds, in itself, for interpreting a clause as behavioural.

[3] To be clear, the prepositional phrase to Herman Kahn does not serve as the Range of a behavioural Process, most obviously because it is not a Behaviour. For Halliday, it serves as a circumstance of Place that expresses orientation. Halliday (1994: 139):

Certain types of circumstance are associated with behaviour processes … Some of those in groups (i)–(iii) also regularly feature a prepositional phrase in it with to, at or on: I’m talking to you, don’t look at me, fortune is smiling on us. These are, in origin, circumstances of Place; in the behavioural context they express orientation but we may continue to use that label.